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Defendant-Respondent. ) 
) 
Appellant (Call) respectfully petitions this Court 
to rehear that portion of its opinion which refuses to 
certify this case as a class action. In support of this 
petition, appellant relies upon the points and authorities 
below. 
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POINT ONE 
REHEARING IS NECESSARY 
BECAUSE THE COURT'S OPINION IS BASED UPON 
CONJECTURE AND SPECULATION OUTSIDE OF THE RECORD 
The central issue on class certification was 
whether or not Rule 23(a) (1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
had been met. This is often referred to as the numerosity 
requirement. 
A* THE COURT'S OPINION WAS BASED UPON A CORRECT LEGAL 
PRINCIPLE. 
During the briefing, Call argued that the size of 
the class was approximately one hundred members. Call 
further argued that classes of forty or more members would 
2 
be presumed to satisfy Rule 23(a)(1). 
This Court ruled that a finding on Rule 23(a)(1) 
should not be based upon numbers alone. This Court ruled 
that the Court ought to look at other factors in deciding 
whether or not joinder is "impracticable." See Slip Opinion 
at p. 5 & 6. 
"One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as 
representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class 
is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable." 
Rule 23(a)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2 
". . .The difficulty inherent in joining as few as forty 
class members should raise a presumption that joinder is 
impracticable, and the plaintiff whose class is that large or 
larger should meet the test of Rule 23(a)(1) on that fact 
alone." Newberg on Class Actions, 2 Ed., §3.05 at p. 142. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Call concedes that this Court's legal analysis is 
correct. Newberg states the rule as follows: 
But numbers are only one of several 
considerations. Apart from class size, 
factors relevant to the joinder imprac-
ticability issue include judicial 
economy arising from the avoidance of a 
multiplicity of actions, geographic 
disbursement of class members, size of 
individual claims, financial resources 
of class members, the ability of claim-
ants to institute individual suits, and 
requests for prospective injunctive 
relief which will involve future class 
members. 
Newberg on Class Actions, 2nd Ed., 
§3.06. 
B. THIS COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE FACTS TO CORRECT LEGAL 
PRINCIPLES. 
After reaching a correct legal conclusion, this 
Court applied facts to the law. However, in so doing, this 
Court resorted to speculation and conjecture outside the 
record. Specifically, this Court speculated that the 
putative class members: 
. . .are developers engaged in business 
whose claims are not so insubstantial 
that joinder or individual suits would 
not merit the cost. 
If true, that is of course a key fact which fits 
into the Court's legal analysis. However, there is no 
factual basis for that speculation. Certainly, Judge Dee 
did not make any such finding. The true facts are that: 
A. Approximately 60% of the claims of putative 
class members are for less than $10,000. 
B. Approximately 44% of the claims of putative 
class members are for less than $5,000. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
C* Approximately 26% of the claims for putative 
class members are less than $2,500. 
D. Approximately 8% of the claims of putative 
class members are for less than $lf000. 
(R. 895-896.3) 
There is simply no factual basis to suppose that 
people with claims of $1,000 to $5,000 can afford the ex-
pense and risk of individual litigation. After all, this 
case has already consumed eight years risk of individual 
litigation and three Supreme Court opinions. 
If this opinion is permitted to stand, it will 
mean that there can never be a class action in Utah unless 
the damages are less than $500 per person. That is simply 
not the law in any other jurisdiction (state or federal) . 
Rather, the correct rule is as follows: 
It is important to note that though the 
existence of small claims may be a 
strong element in approving class 
actions, the presence of large claims is 
not a ground for class denial. 
Newberg on Class Actions, 2nd Ed., 
§4.39 at p. 363. 
This is only a partial list of subdivisions. 
Compare R. 191-192. 
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POINT TWO 
REHEARING IS NECESSARY AS SEVERAL 
IMPORTANT ISSUES REMAIN IN THE CASE 
Call has urged that this case be certified under 
4 
Rule 23(b) (1) (A), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Indeed, 
Call has pointed out that Rule 23(b)(1)(A) was invented for 
this specific type of case: 
To illustrate: separate actions by 
individuals against a municipality to 
declare a bond issue invalid. .to 
prevent or limit the making of a partic-
ular appropriation or to compel or to 
invalidate an assessment. . . 
Notes of the Advisory Committee on 
Rules, 39 F.R.D. 100. 
follows: 
This Courtfs opinion disposes of that argument as 
Because of our ruling on the merits of 
the case, there is no possibility of 
inconsistent judgments and no issue of 
substantial public interest remains. 
Slip Opinion, at p. 6. 
4 
"The prosecution of separate actions by or against 
individual members of the class would create a risk of 
[inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to 
individual members of the class which would establish 
incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the 
class." 
5 That is a dangerous rule which has apparently never been 
followed by any court in the U.S. This precendent would invite 
trial courts to always deny claims for class certification 
under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) . The trial court would always be upheld 
on appeal because an appellate court could always say that 
there is no chance for inconsistent judgments after the ruling 
on the merits. In short, this opinion would emasculate Rule 
23(b)(1)(A). For a case which so holds, see India v. United 
Air Lines, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 1, 12 at paragraph 20, (N.D. Cal. 
1979). 
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However, the Court's opinion overlooks the fact 
that other important issues remain in the case. 
For example, Call has prayed for injunctive 
relief. (R. 331-343, See Prayer at paragraphs K b ) , 2 (b) , 
3(b), 4(b), 5(b), 6(b), and 7(b).) Although this Court has 
ruled on the merits, the case must now be returned to con-
sider the shape of any injunctive relief. It is not likely 
that West Jordan will roll over and play dead on the injunc-
tion issue. Certainly, the shape of the injunction will 
have impact on all putative class members. 
There is also an important statute of limitations 
issue left in the case. West Jordan is not ready to pay out 
claims to all comers. Rather, West Jordan has taken the 
position that the statute of limitations bars all other 
putative class members. (See Exhibit A.) Thus, the trial 
court must decide whether the statute of limitations has 
been tolled by reason of the class action. That is 
7 
obviously an issue that will have classwide applications. 
Because of the trial court's adverse rulings, West Jordan 
has had no reason to raise the statute of limitations defense 
until now. 
7 It is true that West Jordan mades no statute of 
limitations claim against Call. Or, in other words, the 
statute of limitations issue is moot as to Call. However, it 
is settled that Call may still litigate class issues that may 
be moot as to him. See Deposit Guarantee Natl. Bank v. Roper, 
445 U.S. 326 (1980); and, United States Parole Comm. v. 
Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980H See also, Newberg on Class; 
Actions, 2nd Ed., §2.32 and §2.33. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Finally, there is an important issue remaining of 
a civil rights violation under 42 U.S.C. §1983. (See R. 338 
at paragraphs 38-41.) Because of the adverse rulings of the 
lower court, that issue has been moot. However, the civil 
rights claim is now ripe for further proceedings in the 
trial court. 
In summary, there are important issues remaining. 
Thus, is is too soon to discard the class device as unneces-
sary. 
POINT THREE 
REHEARING IS NECESSARY BECAUSE 
THE COURT HAS OVERLOOKED OVERWHELMING 
AUTHORITY ON THE ISSUE OF INDIVIDUALIZED DAMAGES 
This Court has denied class certification, in 
part, because: 
Judicial economy would be little served 
because the amount of the claim of each 
class member would still need to be 
determined on an individual basis, 
regardless of class action status. 
Slip Opinion, at p. 6. 
Virtually, no other court (state or federal) has 
adopted such a rule: 
Though at least some courts have 
suggested that differences in the amount 
of damages claimed will make a plain-
tiff s claim atypical, most courts have 
declined even to consider that argument, 
and nearly all of those that have ruled 
on it have rejected it outright. If 
differences in amounts of individual 
damages would make a class action 
improper, a class action for damages 
would never be possible, because varia-
tions in amount of damages among class Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
happen to be identically situated 
factually, which is not required under 
Rule 23. The existence of a class ac-
tion provision for damage actions itself 
indicates that the drafters of the rule 
contemplated certifications for classes 
raising common liability issues, even 
where the amounts of damages claimed 
varied among class members. 
Newberg on Class Actions, 2nd Ed., 
§3.16. 
See also, Appellant's Reply Brief, at p. 34 and 35. 
If this opinion is permitted to stand, it will 
serve as an erroneous precedent for hundreds of other class 
actions now pending in the trial courts. 
POINT FOUR 
THE CASE SHOULD BE RETURNED TO THE 
TRIAL COURT FOR REPROCESSING BECAUSE THE 
TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE ANY FINDING OF SUBSTANCE 
This Court has observed that the correct standard 
of review is whether the trial court abused its discretion. 
(Slip Opinion, at p. 5.) However, how can this Court review 
the trial court's discretion when it doesn't know what the 
trial court had in mind? See Gibson v. Supercargoes & 
Checkers of Intl. Longshoremen's Union, 543 F.2d 1239 at n.2 
(9th Cir. 1976) . Moreover, the absence of adequate findings 
was an invitation for this Court to speculate on facts. 
(See Point One above.) 
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During the briefing, Call advised the Court of 
this defect in the record. See Appellant's Reply Brief, at 
p. 35, n*13. See also Gulf Oil v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 68 
L.Ed. 2d 693, 101 S. Ct. 2193 (1981); India v. United Air 
Lines, Inc., 565 F.2d 554, 562 (9th Cir. 1977); Eisenberg v. 
Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770 (3rd Cir. 1985). 
In Eisenberg, supra, the appellate court refused 
to make its own findings on class issues: 
First, we find it difficult to 
evaluate, on a cold record, several of 
the remaining prerequisites to a 
23(b)(3) class action, which the dis-
trict court did not address. . . 
Second, class actions depend on the 
continuing supervision of the district 
court, including reconsideration of the 
efficacy of class action treatment as 
the circumstances change. One circum-
stance that has clearly changed is that 
Eisenberg & Nissen have won a judgment 
on the merits. [Emphasis added.J 
See also, India v. United Airlines, supra, for a 
case where the appellate court remanded for the trial court 
to enter appropriate findings. ~ 
DATED this fTday of fn^") , 1986. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-
Appellants 
B y - VuwLJ^* 
ROBERT J. DEB$¥" 
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8 D DESERET NEWS, MON. P.M./TUES. A.M., JULY 28-29, 1986 
W. Jordan assessing impact of ruling 
Some confusion floating around decision that park fee ordinance is invalid 
By Steve Fidel 
Deseret News staff writer 
WEST JORDAN — City officials are still assess-
ing the impact of a Utah Supreme Court opinion 
Friday that declared a park development fee ordi-
nance invalid. 
Since 1975, the city has required developers to 
donate 7 percent of the land they plan to develop or 
7 percent of the land value to the city for park 
development. Justice Richard C. Howe wrote the 4-
1 decision declaring the West Jordan development 
law invalid because the city did not hold a proper 
public hearing before implementing the law. 
City Manager Ron Olson said the fee was revised 
in 1981, and proper hearings were held then. The 
only issue the Supreme Court addressed, as he sees 
it, revolves around the $16,500 in fees that were 
collected before 1981. Whether the city will have to 
refund any of the fees collected will be decided by 
3rd District Judge David B. Dee, Olson said. 
The Utah Supreme Court has heard the West Jor-
dan park fee issue four or five times. "This is the 
first time they have ruled against us. The first time, 
the constitutionality of the law was attacked, but it 
was upheld," Olson said. 
Dee originally heard the case, brought by John 
Call and Clark Jenkins, developers of the Westcall 
subdivision at approximately 00th South and 40th 
West. Olson said he personally attended the pro-
ceedings in Dees court but first learned of the Su-
preme Court ruling Saturday. He said the city is still 
evaluating the court opinion and no court dates 
have been set to consider whether any of the fees 
collected will have to be returned. 
4<lt seems that our exposure would be limited to 
the Westcall subdivision. The fee as it stands today 
is in full compliance, as far as I know," Olson said. 
A statute of limitations may limit fee refunds to 
Call and Jenkins. "I think there is a statute of limi-
tations on filing a protest or a claim. The only ones 
that have done that are the Westcall people," Olson 
said. "Apparently the court denied a class action 
request." 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
My name is Robert J. DeBry. I am attorney of 
record for appellants in this case. I hereby certify that 
the Petition for Rehearing was filed in good faith and not 
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs-
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